Iran's recent history is a roller coaster of contrasts, alternating between hope and despair, tradition and modernization, revolution and counter-revolution, conservatism and reformism.
Following the death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash last month, the country is set to mark another historic moment as it prepares for presidential elections on June 28.
These state-imposed elections will reveal the Iranian regime's future plans for the country.
Is the political regime willing to ease social and political tensions at home and open up to the world, or does it prefer to maintain the growing divisions between the Iranian people and the nation at home while continuing its confrontational policies externally?
If the former is chosen, it may be time for a focus on governance and normalization after years of internal division in Iran, but if the latter is chosen, the legitimacy crisis Iran has experienced will be prolonged by unresolved domestic grievances and the state will remain focused on crisis management.
The president who is elected through this electoral process will have a partial answer as to what the outcome will be.
Beyond the Supreme Leader
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran's political structure, based on the concept of absolute protection of Islamic jurists, is one of the most multi-layered systems in the world.
In this system, the Guardian of Islamic Jurists, Vali-e-Faqih (currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei), is the Supreme Leader with constitutional authority over public, state, and religious affairs. According to this political theology, the Supreme Leader is responsible for protecting the state until the return of the divinely appointed 12th Shiite Imam (Imam al-Mahdi, also known as the Hidden Imam), who the majority of Shiite Muslims believe has been in exile since 874.
In Iran, the Supreme Leader theoretically has the final say in state affairs and a lot of power is concentrated in his hands, but that doesn't mean he has a monopoly on power, and there are other centers of power that have great influence.
The first tier of the power structure is the Legislature, the Judicial Branch, and the Executive Branch. None of these centers of power are merely “symbolic”. Rather, each has great influence and impact on the other centers of power, which sometimes leads to power struggles. However, thanks to the role played by the second tier of the power structure, the Parliament and the Council, these power struggles do not paralyze the system.
The supreme leader, legislature, judiciary, and executive branch appoint most of the members of these parliaments and councils, while the rest are elected by the people. Many parliaments and councils, such as the Assembly of Experts, the Supreme National Security Council, the Council of State Expediency, and the Guardian Council, function like parallel states and intervene in state affairs when there are disagreements or crises between the branches.
In these bodies, the distribution of members from the various political currents embraced by the state determines the balance of power in the country. In many cases, such as in matters of national security, sensitive regional policies, or nuclear activities, councils and parliaments are much more active and accountable than the government or parliament, but their power remains below that of the supreme leader.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is Iran's elite armed force that controls advanced weaponry and large-scale investment projects in various business sectors, and is another layer of the regime that wields great influence over Iran's regional and international policies.
The IRGC and its paramilitary volunteer militia, the Basij, wield enormous power over Iran's politics and decision-making process. Retired IRGC generals frequently enter politics, hold senior positions in parliament and banking, run for office or endorse candidates, often determining whether a candidate wins an election.
Another layer of Iran's power structure is the business community. This group's majority families were promoted and privileged during the presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, which destroyed the country's infrastructure and manufacturing capacity. This class was relied upon to lead the post-war reconstruction, revive the shattered economy, and encourage industrial production. Its influence on Iranian politics is growing.
Then there are the Islamic leaders, most of whom have education and religion degrees from the country's largest Islamic seminary in the city of Qom and who wield some influence over decision-making.
Leading the presidential race
Several influential figures from various political trends have declared their candidacy for the presidential election, but their candidacy will be approved by the Guardian Council, a 12-member body of jurists, half appointed by the supreme leader and the other half by parliament, by June 11. It is difficult to predict how the Guardian Council will decide on its outcome, as agreements and power struggles between the aforementioned institutions and groups will affect the council's decisions.
Ali Larijani is one of the leading candidates and is seen as likely to win if voter turnout is high and reformists show up to the polls.
A moderate conservative, he is often considered a pragmatist. Larijani comes from a family of prominent Islamic scholars who have held influential positions since the 1979 revolution. He himself graduated from the seminary in Qom with a Bachelor of Science degree and a Doctorate in Western Philosophy. Larijani currently serves as a member of the consultative Expediency Council, was speaker of parliament from 2008 to 2020, and has also held positions within the security services.
The Guardian Council disqualified Larijani from running for president in 2021, but many believe the Supreme Leader has now approved his candidacy. Widely seen as a flexible politician who might reengage in nuclear negotiations with the West, Larijani's candidacy would make him a strong candidate, drawing support from both conservative and reformist voters.
But Larijani's relative popularity among conservatives and reformists may mean he faces a tricky balancing act: staying loyal to the regime while promising change to appeal to reformists, with anti-government sentiment still strong after the 2022 protests.
Another member of the Expediency Council is hardline conservative politician Said Jalili, whose victory in the presidential elections would signify a completely different course than that of Larijani. A popular figure among conservatives, the former nuclear negotiator has strong ties to the supreme leader and the IRGC and is seen as a staunch loyalist.
Jalili previously ran unsuccessfully for president in 2013, losing to Hassan Rouhani. In 2021, he voted for the conservative Raisi and withdrew from the election. If Jalili becomes president, he is expected to continue Raisi's policies, given the close relationship between the two and the widespread perception that Jalili influenced the former president's decisions.
A low turnout election would favor Jalili because it would likely lead to reformists abstaining from the polls and his main supporters, the conservatives, dominating the polls.
Besides Larijani and Jalili, there are two other candidates worth mentioning.
Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf, a moderate conservative who currently serves as speaker of Iran's parliament, served as mayor of Tehran from 2005 to 2017 and is considered a technocrat with deep ties to Iran's security services, having previously been appointed commander of the Revolutionary Guard's air force and chief of police.
Among the candidates for the presidential election, Ghalibaf is considered the closest to the IRGC. He is also known to be close to Khamenei. These connections greatly increase his chances of winning the election. However, he is frequently attacked by Jalili and media connected to ultra-conservatives, so his presidential campaign will not be smooth sailing.
Eshaq Jahangiri is the only prominent reformist candidate to announce his candidacy for the presidential election. He served as first vice president under President Hassan Rouhani from 2013 to 2021. Prior to that, he served as Minister of Industry and Mines from 1997 to 2005 under the Islamic Republic's first reformist president, Mohamed Khatami. He also campaigned for reformist Mir Hossein Mousavi's 2009 presidential election, a contentious election that led to Green Movement protests.
Jahangiri has consistently supported reformists and moderate politicians throughout his political career. Some hope he can unite reformists, but he has never openly and directly opposed the political establishment. The reformists remain clearly divided, lacking a unifying force, a comprehensive narrative to define their position, and a strong figure to lead them.
Jahangiri's only chance lies in Iran's sectarian politics: If hardline conservative Saeed Jalili leads in the polls, reformist voters might rally to his side and prevent him from winning the election.
Much will depend on voter turnout in the presidential election. Traditionally, high voter turnout has been the main basis for the political system's national legitimacy in Iran. But record-low voter turnout in the past two elections has become a pressing concern among the ruling elite. And while the government has been able to largely quell anti-government protests that began in 2022, many Iranians are unwilling to lend legitimacy to the Islamic Republic by participating in elections.
To avoid a legitimacy crisis, electoral systems are likely to try to stage seemingly competitive races so that multiple candidates appear on the ballot in order to garner public support and ensure high voter turnout.
But the candidates allowed to run are those loyal to the Islamic Republic's system. And in reality, with no change in the supreme leader and the IRGC's role still dominant, the election results and winners are not expected to significantly change the country's domestic and foreign policies. Iran's political system is strong, and those inside have no intention of giving up power.
