Qalibaf is a leading candidate for Iran's presidential elections
Following the death of President Ebrahim Raisi, Iran is set to hold new presidential elections on June 28. The elections have attracted considerable attention from observers keen to analyse the profiles of the candidates, their chances of winning, and the influence of key politicians within the regime.
The election comes at a time when Iran is experiencing unprecedented domestic and regional tensions. Domestically, the sense of expectation and uncertainty is palpable. Regionally, the once clandestine Iran-Israel conflict has escalated into open and direct military conflict, further exacerbating the country's turmoil.
The situation has been further complicated by the death of a key politician known for his unwavering loyalty to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Raisi had successfully navigated numerous obstacles by demonstrating his complete deference to the Supreme Leader's instructions. His death leaves a large vacuum, exacerbating an already complicated situation as the country prepares for the next presidential elections.
The list of six finalists was published by the Guardian Council on Sunday. The candidates are Mohammed Bagher Qalibaf, Saeed Jalili, Massoud Pezeshkian, Amir Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi, Alireza Zakhani and Mostafa Pourmohammadi. The final list reveals several important insights.
The vetting process is supposed to be fair, but the final list once again proves that it is not.
Dr. Mohammed Alsulami
First, as expected, the conservative-dominated Guardian Council released a list dominated by Iran's conservative wing, with the only exception being reformist Pezeshkian. The vetting process is supposed to be fair, but the final list once again proves that it is not, with conservative figures known for their loyalty to the supreme leader and the political establishment drowning out reformist voices.
Among Khamenei's most prominent hard-liners and aides on the list are Iranian Parliament Speaker Qalibaf, Tehran Mayor Zakhani and former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and member of the Expediency Council.
Mr. Jalili is expected to be the leading candidate. He is a staunch supporter of Khamenei and previously led Iran's nuclear negotiating team. He is close to Ahmad Alamolhoda, a prominent cleric who is the Friday prayer leader in Mashhad and Mr. Raisi's father-in-law. Mr. Jalili has run for president twice before, losing the first time and withdrawing the second time.
Qalibaf, a professor of political geography and former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, was re-elected speaker of parliament in late May. Some observers attributed the victory to intervention by the supreme leader's office to dissuade him from running for president, while others saw it as support for his candidacy to represent the conservative faction. This will be Qalibaf's fourth run for president after losses in 2005 and 2013 and a withdrawal in 2017 to avoid splitting the conservative vote.
The second observation is that many media reports on the finalization of the list of candidates suggested confusion and chaos within the reform camp, despite the return to politics of prominent reformists, including Eshaq Jahangiri, who served as vice president under Hassan Rouhani, and Abdolnaser Hemmati, a former central bank governor.
The situation for reformists worsened after the Guardian Council disqualified a significant percentage of reformist candidates in the recent parliamentary elections, raising fears of further disqualifications and reinforcing the perception that the supreme leader's efforts are directed at electing a new hardline president.
The lack of a unified position among reformists on the front-runner further exacerbates their challenges. Some in the reformist camp are now uniting behind Pezeshkian and urging their support base to turn out in large numbers on election day. Given that the regime suffers from a severe lack of legitimacy, compounded by the socio-economic crisis and fraud inflicted on the Iranian people, it is believed that Pezeshkian's endorsement may be a strategic tactic by the regime to boost voter turnout on election day and give the electoral process a semblance of openness and competitiveness.
However, this could backfire if a wave of support for Pezeshkian emerges, as happened in 2013. Back then, Rouhani was not initially a serious candidate, but several factors worked in his favor, leading to a surprise victory. This may be less likely this time around, as Pezeshkian is less well known. Pezeshkian's victory would go against the recent trend of consolidating the government and establishment with conservatives to ensure the succession. But the Supreme Leader and other decision-makers will no doubt be watching closely.
Qalibaf also has the backing of the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, making his candidacy look strong.
Dr. Mohammed Alslami
The third point is that despite the popularity of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, he did not receive Khamenei's support and was disqualified again. Mr Ahmadinejad has been described by people close to the Supreme Leader as leading a “false movement” and has been explicitly accused of trying to reduce the influence of the religious establishment. Having openly opposed the Supreme Leader's positions, he was questioned in parliament, becoming the first Iranian president to face such rigorous scrutiny of his statements, demands and proposals.
The decision to disqualify Ahmadinejad is based on the regime's principle that “the first mistake is the last mistake” when it comes to former administrative leaders, which has resulted in many former leaders, including Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mohammed Khatami, Rouhani and the two Larijanis, being removed from the political stage for their perceived failures.
A fourth observation is the endorsement of a number of leading conservative figures, primarily to encourage conservative voters to vote in large numbers on Election Day. Given the fact that these figures have vendettas and personal grudges against one another, this will add legitimacy to the system, bring some interest to the presidential campaign, and make the prospect of the election debates more exciting and interesting for onlookers and observers.
Moreover, as in past elections, it is likely that some of the conservative candidates will give way to someone like Qalibaf, who is considered the leading candidate for the presidential election. Therefore, it would not be surprising if Zakani and Jalili, under the instructions of the Supreme Leader, would back Qalibaf and withdraw at some point. Qalibaf also enjoys the backing of the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, making his position as a candidate seem strong. However, he has been tainted by corruption charges, and many are pessimistic about what would happen if Qalibaf, who combines conservatism and pragmatism, becomes president.
In conclusion, the regime’s overall objective seems clear: to select a candidate who is in line with the Supreme Leader’s agenda according to Khamenei’s long-established formula, which includes placing loyalists in key institutions and excluding figures from the old guard to ensure a smooth succession selection process.
Khamenei and the IRGC appear to want a president who will not succumb to regional and international pressure and pander to Western policies as was the case under Rouhani. As a result, their preference leans toward someone like Qalibaf, who has firm positions and policies, especially regarding the completion of Iran's nuclear program. However, last-minute changes in calculations are common in Iranian politics as new variables and circumstances are introduced, so this is something to watch out for until the final results of the presidential election are announced.
- Dr. Mohammed Al Sulami is the founder and director of the International Iranian Institute (Rasana). X: @mohalsulami
Disclaimer: The views expressed by the authors in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect the views of Arab News.
