In February's presidential election, there appeared to be a decline in the use of religion as a motivation to win votes in North Sumatra. This change reflected the nation's tendency to emphasize pragmatism over piety in politics.
Two months after Indonesians voted, there is still a general lament over the decline of democracy in investigations into the alleged misuse of government funds and in elite discussions about presidential elections (PEs) and general elections (GEs). Allegations of election fraud remain unresolved. Less attention has been paid to the role of identity politics, or lack thereof, in what many consider the most controversial election of the post-reform era (post-1998-1999). Given that religion was the most important tool of political mobilization in PE in 2019, the seeming absence of the role of religion as a factor in recent elections was interesting.
North Sumatra's religious composition exemplifies Indonesia's multireligious nature, with 67 percent of its 15 million inhabitants being Muslim, 31 percent Christian, and more than 2 percent Buddhist. Despite being predominantly Muslim, the country's fourth most populous state is the birthplace of Christianity and boasts the second largest Christian community among the 38 states. Members of different religions simultaneously belong to various ethnic groups that transcend religious boundaries. Despite its diversity, North Sumatra is generally harmonious.
When it comes to elections, North Sumatra voted along religious lines before 2024.
My observation of the 2018 governor and 2019 PE reveals that the state is geographically divided between predominantly Muslim areas on the east coast and predominantly Christian areas on the west coast. has become clear. The former overwhelmingly voted for candidates representing Islamic conservatism, namely 2019 PE candidate Prabowo Subianto and gubernatorial election winner Eddy Rahmayadi. In contrast, the West Coast won gubernatorial tickets from people who support religious pluralism, including Joko Widodo, who won in 2019, and Christian candidate Sihar Citrus, who lost in 2018. They rallied in support of Jarot Shikhar's team.
On a partisan basis, the 2018 North Sumatra governorship election reflected the 2019 polarization at the national level. A pro-Islamist coalition led by the Islamist Prosperity and Justice Party (PKS) and Prabowo's Indonesian Grand Movement Party (Gerindra) won decisive victories in Muslim areas against a pluralist coalition led by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). . The PDI-P candidate was Widodo, who won in the Christian area.
It was therefore unusual for North Sumatra in 2024, where religious demographics appeared to play a less important role in shaping local voters' political preferences. All Muslim and Christian districts voted overwhelmingly for Prabowo and Ghibran Rakabumin Raka, except for three Muslim districts: Tanjung Baray City, Padang Sidempuan and Mandarin Natal. The latter voted for the team of Anies Baswedan versus Muhaimin Iskandar, the pair with the most obviously Islamic leanings.
There are several possible explanations.
First, having three sets of candidates in PE2024 reduced the salience of religion as a mobilization tool. Religion appears to be more effective or salient in cases of direct confrontation. Political polarization – defined as the division of political attitudes into two (or more) mutually exclusive camps – feeds on notable social cleavages such as religion. Polarization suppresses “within-group” differences, and he reduces the many differences between two groups into one difference. Such “differences” are negatively charged and used to define the “other” (i.e., competing political teams or candidates). Religion and religiosity can make such differences. In the 2018 and 2019 elections in North Sumatra, religious differences played a negative role and were used to define two competing camps, a sign of deep polarization in the two-horse race. It can be considered as an example.
When it comes to elections, North Sumatra voted along religious lines before 2024.
In PE2024, a three-way race, one exit poll showed that the pair Dr. Prabowo Gibran and Dr. Gunjal Pranowo Mahfud are generally considered to represent pluralism. President Widodo supported Prabowo-Gibran. It is not known whether he represents Islamic conservatism. PDI-P supports Ganjar-Mahfud, and both men have meaningful ties to Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia's largest moderate Islamic organization. Therefore, both pairs essentially shared the same pluralistic base of support.
In contrast, Anis Muhaimin was seen as representing Islam and Islamist interests. This is largely due to Anies' past ties to a conservative Islamic organization whose bitter religion-based campaign led to his victory in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. However, since Muhaimin is also the leader of the People's Awakening Party (PKB), which advocates for moderate Islam, the intensity of conservative religious mobilization in PE2024 is likely to weaken.
As a result, the PE movement active in North Sumatra lacked conservative religious rhetoric. The author's interviews with Agnes Muhaymin's campaign team in Medan revealed that they prioritize governance issues over religion. Their slogan of “transformation” embodied concerns about the weakening of the rule of law and the spread of undemocratic practices such as dynastic politics. I'm not sure if this attitude emphasizes a preference for a more conservative Islamic society, but the clear difference in the opposition's voice from PE2019 to his PE2024 is the lack of religious rhetoric. had.
Second, all three presidential candidates have Muslim credentials. Mr. Anis and Mr. Prabowo have been associated with conservative Islamic groups during past election campaigns, making them relevant to voters who prioritize a candidate's Muslim credentials when voting. Mr. Mahfud has close ties to NU through his family, and Mr. Ganjar's wife is the granddaughter of a prominent NU leader.
Third, and especially important in North Sumatra, PE candidates showed respect for the province's Islamic leaders. Mr. Ganjar and Mr. Anies visited Tuan Guru Babussalam Beshiram separately. He is the leader of the prominent Muslim Tarekat Naqshabandia. Tasawfufu The Sufi order's political preferences influenced voters in the 2018 gubernatorial election.
Additionally, the Widodo government's ban on hard-line Islamic organizations has significantly reduced their ability and vitality to mobilize voters by 2024.
Fourth, Prabowo, who conservative Islamic groups wholeheartedly supported in PE2019, has willingly joined his former rival Widodo's government, leading many North Sumatran (and domestic) voters to vote based on religion and ideology. It is likely that this was discouraged. Voting for Prabowo-Gibran was a more “realistic” welfare-maximizing move.
Is the lack of religion-based voting a good thing for democracy in North Sumatra and Indonesia? On the surface, it seems likely that voters are no longer attracted to election campaign rhetoric that undermines religious minorities. , appears to be a positive development.
However, the absence of religion-based voting has not made Indonesian voters more conscious of the good governance necessary for real democratic progress. In return, voters chose Prabowo's “free lunch” promise, the delivery of staple food parcels (distributed during Widodo's visit the day after his son Gibran and Prabowo held a rally in North Sumatra), and more. focused on short-term gains such as obvious vote-buying actions. Voters seemed to accept bias in state institutions and even relied on false or superficial information from social media to obtain voting information.
Although the results of the 2024 parliamentary elections show that there are still people who choose parliamentary candidates who have contributed to alleviating the social problems in the province, the voting behavior of North Sumatra and Indonesians in PE2024 is likely to affect the future of Indonesia. raises concerns about democracy.
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