Iran is set to hold snap presidential elections in about two weeks following the death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in the country's northwest last month. The Guardian Council, responsible for vetting presidential and parliamentary candidates, has approved the qualifications of six mostly conservative candidates out of 80 presidential candidates. The council has barred several prominent politicians from the election, including former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, former Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani, and reformist former Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri. Despite disqualifying many strong presidential candidates, the Guardian Council's election manipulation has not rendered Iran's presidential election completely meaningless. Though far from a fair contest, the polls allow for some political competition, allowing many Iranian voters to find their next favorite candidate in the race.
Three of the six existing candidates on the ballot can be considered serious contenders or front-runners representing different segments of Iran's political landscape. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the current speaker of parliament, is a pragmatic conservative politician with decades of experience in mostly administrative roles, including as commander of the Revolutionary Guards, police chief, mayor of Tehran, and speaker of parliament. Saeed Jalili, a former chief nuclear negotiator under Ahmadinejad and currently an appointed member of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, can be considered an ideological conservative politician. A relatively new public figure, Jalili does not have Ghalibaf's administrative experience, but he attracts the support of the staunch revolutionary wing of Iran's conservative political camp. Finally, Massoud Pezeshkian is a long-time reformist member of the Iranian parliament and minister of health under reformist President Mohammad Khatami. A low-profile and uncharismatic reform politician, Pezechkian faces an uphill battle to mobilize his reformist base in the upcoming elections.
With none of the presidential candidates receiving overwhelming popular support, the election is likely to be a runoff between two of the three leading candidates. Ghalibaf has support from mainstream conservative political groups and the non-ideological grassroots, as evidenced by the recent election for Speaker of Parliament, and appears to have an advantage over the other two leading candidates. In contrast, Jalili represents the fringe of the conservative political camp and appears too revolutionary for the political tastes of traditional conservatives.
It is also unlikely that Pezeshkian will be able to effectively counter Ghalibaf's electoral ambitions, as the broad base of the Iranian reformist and secular electorate has not been mobilized. Although many reformist political groups and politicians, including reformist former president Mohammad Khatami, have recently voiced their support for Pezeshkian, they are unlikely to turn out in large numbers given the disillusionment of many reformist and secular voters with Iran's political and electoral system in recent years. The Guardian Council's banning of key reformist and centrist politicians from the elections has further alienated many citizens from the upcoming elections. Pezeshkian's ethnic Azerbaijani affiliation is also not expected to translate into significant voter mobilization, as ideological and political divisions are far more pronounced than ethnic divisions in Iran's national elections. This is mainly due to the fact that ethnic and political divisions do not reinforce each other in Azerbaijani-speaking provinces, as in most other provinces in the country, which reduces the political importance of ethnicity in Iran's national elections in these regions.
Iran's next presidential election will likely have a runoff election, with Ghalibaf likely to win, but election results are never predetermined, and as past Iranian elections have demonstrated, campaign momentum shifts, so it is entirely possible for electoral surprises to occur in the future. Regardless of which candidate is likely to win the next election, a more important question may be how the election victories of the three leading candidates will affect Iran's foreign policy, particularly Iran's stance on its controversial nuclear program.
Absent other favorable conditions, a change in Iran's executive leadership alone will not bring about a dramatic reorientation of Iran's foreign policy. Given the fragmentation of the Iranian political system, the dispersion of political power among various power centers, the balancing role and special powers of Iran's Supreme Leader, and the need to build consensus among key national political authorities on crucial foreign policy issues, continuity rather than revolutionary change has become the norm within the Iranian political system.
However, if other favorable conditions are in place, as suggested by Hassan Rouhani’s election victory in 2013 and the successful conclusion of nuclear negotiations with the West in 2015, a change in the executive could be the catalyst for a major shift in Iran’s foreign policy. As a moderate and pragmatic politician with the support of reformist and centrist political groups and politicians, Rouhani made his election promises of resolving the international dispute over Iran’s nuclear program and lifting economic sanctions against the country. Therefore, the foreign policy preferences of the Iranian president and his supporting coalition could make a big difference in assessing the impact of a change in the executive on Iran’s foreign policy. Among the current front-runners, Saeed Jalili is seen as the least amenable to compromise on the core interests of Iran’s foreign policy. This can be inferred not only from his foreign policy views and conception of national identity but also from his leadership in Iran’s nuclear negotiations from 2007 to 2013.
As the reformist candidate, Pezeshkian is the most open to compromise in principle when it comes to Iran's foreign policy debate. Like other Iranian moderate and reformist politicians, he is expected to advocate a more cautious and less confrontational foreign policy that is in keeping with the reformist politicians' balanced view of the country's ideological, economic, and national security interests.
As a pragmatic conservative, Ghalibaf's foreign policy preferences fall between the two extremes of ideological conservatives and moderate reformists. He does not advocate a strategic reorientation of Iran's foreign policy like reformists. However, he is not as uncompromising and inflexible as ideological and revolutionary conservatives. Personality-wise, Ghalibaf has demonstrated throughout his career that he is more of a practical problem solver than a political ideologue. Given his personality and political worldview as a pragmatic conservative, Ghalibaf is expected to accept tactical leniency on certain foreign policy issues without challenging the overall strategic direction of Iran's foreign policy. These foreign policy directions are more in tune with the preferences of Iran's supreme leader and national security establishment than those of reformists or ideological conservative presidents, as the history of Iranian foreign policymaking over the past few decades has shown.
Overall, given the current absence of other conditions necessary for a major shift in foreign policy, Iran’s foreign policy is likely to remain largely the same for the foreseeable future, with perhaps some tactical leniency and stylistic changes, regardless of who wins among the three leading candidates in Iran’s next presidential elections.
